The escalating planetary crises of human-induced climate change, the depletion of natural resources, and declining biodiversity call for urgent actions to be taken at all levels of society and by the global community. The current political strategy for a sustainable future that emphasizes economic and technological progress is insufficient to bring about the change required; an educational approach based on identities, values, ethics, and new worldviews is also needed. In this article Arto O. Salonen and his coauthors consider the (...) kind of pedagogy that could support a transformation of the human conception of reality into a form that both recognizes the connections and interactions between people, society, and the planet, and imparts an ethical orientation to action that strengthens the health and integrity of all entities. A theory of planetary social pedagogy (PSP) is based on traditional social pedagogy, which provides a theoretical framework for formal, nonformal, and informal education. PSP aims at building a deep holistic understanding of the relationship between the individual, society, and Earth by integrating the fragmented human conception and experience of reality by uniting the three dimensions of a social-ecological worldview: spatial, temporal, and ethical. Moreover, PSP is a cyclical learning process that alternates between cognitive, metacognitive, and epistemic levels of learning. The ultimate goal of using PSP is to lay the foundation for a fundamental transformation of the ideals, values, and culture that shape human behavior in ways necessary for securing a sustainable future. (shrink)

The paper discusses the relation between chess and philosophy, examining, among other things, how far chess might reveal important features of philosophical problemanalysis and argumentation. There is a plurality of scientific, philosophical, and other perspectives from which chess can be viewed. Some attention must be drawn to these various ways of conceptualizing the game, but the main emphasis of the paper lies in uncovering certain philosophically- and metaphilosophically- relevant basic assumptions of chess. It is argued that the thought patterns and (...) reasoning procedures typical of chess seem to merge into those practised in philosophy. Moreover, we face in the common area of chess and other disciplines a multifarious possibility of research programmes, which promise to turn out useful both for the scientific and aesthetic understanding, and perhaps also for the chess tournament practice. Certain philosophical insights inspired by the practice of chess may lead us to transform our views about various complex human phenomena: not only about the nature of calculatory problem-solving and the relation between human intelligence and artificial intelligence, but also about ethical reasoning and even philosophical argumentation itself. (shrink)

Bernard Bolzano criticised Kant's philosophy so vehemently that his pupil Franz Prihonsky called him "Anti-Kant". One of his criticisms concerns Kant's cosmological antinomies. The context of this critique is the problem of limits of knowledge. Kant wanted to prove that there are such boundaries, and to show where these are located. In this paper we will schematize Kant's antinomies and summarize Bolzano's criticism, which is distributed over his and his student's work. At the beginning we will work out the theoretical (...) differences between Kant's and Bolzano's philosophy to see what roles these play in the construction of the antinomies. (shrink)

Eino Kaila brought new ideas to Finnish philosophy and psychology. He studied at the University of Helsinki in 1908–10 and made study visits, first to Paris in 1911, where he listened to Henri Bergson's lectures, and also to Berlin in 1914. Kaila's dissertation, Über die Motivation und Entscheidung, appeared in 1916. He worked as a critic of theatre and literature and as a dramatist in the Finnish National Theatre, before being nominated professor of philosophy in 1921 to the newly founded (...) University of Turku. There he initiated the founding of the first Finnish institute of experimental psychology. In addition to philosophical works, he published works in psychology. Kaila stayed in Turku until 1930, when he became professor of theoretical philosophy and psychology at the University of Helsinki. In 1948 he was invited to become a member of the recently established Academy of Finland. One may speak of Kaila's Turku period and his Helsinki period . Kaila considered himself a philosopher of nature, whose task is to articulate, using all available means of science, a coherent conception of the world and of mind's place within it. As fellow of the Finnish Academy, he devoted himself to a great project in natural philosophy. The project had two components: first, a rigorous systematic study aiming at a unitary conception of nature, and second, the explication of this conception in a style accessible to a broader audience. The systematic study was to be realized in three volumes; only the first of these ) appeared before his death. As to the more popular work, it was meant to be divided into four parts, of which only the first is complete. The entire planned work was entitled as Hahmottuva maailma . Its first part is devoted to the problem of reality; it concerns the perceptual and conceptual components of everyday experience, and it has been translated from Finnish into German ). (shrink)

Der Begriff 'Sinn' wird im Tractatus in mehrfachem Sinn gebraucht und dem Wertbegriff angenähert. Die Wertprädikate wie 'schön' und 'gut' gehören aber im Tractatus zum Unsinnigen. Während das Sinnvolle in der Beschreibung der Wirklichkeit besteht und das Sinnlose als Grundlage der Deutung der Logik funktioniert, soll das Unsinnige schlechthin unaussag- und undenkbar sein. Dennoch ist es möglich, zwischen zwei Arten des Unsinnigen im Tractatus zu unterscheiden: (1) was gezeigt werden kann, (2) was ohne irgendwelche kognitive Funktion ist. Das mystische Zeigen (...) wird in der späteren Philosophie Wittgensteins entmystifiziert. In ihr kann man auch einer gewissen Differenzierung zwischen der ethischen Charakterisierung und der ästhetischen Charakterisierung der Wirklichkeit nachspüren. (shrink)

There are philosophers who think that questions of fact can be distinguished from questions of interpretation of facts. Davidson calls the distinction between unconceptualized facts and interpretative schemes "the third dogma of empiricism". This points to Quine's article 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism". In it, Quine challenged the distinction between synthetic and analytic statements and the possibility of reducing the meaning of all synthetic statements to immediateexperience. Whereas Quine has remained faithful to empiricism, Davidson gives up empiricism. It is difficult to (...) determine his standpoint. His remark that our actual scheme is best understood as extensional and materialistic, is rather perplexing. Is it intelligible, under Davidson's premisses, to speak of our actual scheme? (shrink)

Bernard Bolzano criticised Kant's philosophy so vehemently that his pupil Franz Prihonsky called him "Anti-Kant". One of his criticisms concerns Kant's cosmological antinomies. The context of this critique is the problem of limits of knowledge. Kant wanted to prove that there are such boundaries, and to show where these are located. In this paper we will (i) schematize Kant's antinomies (to see what Bolzano really criticised on them) and (ii) summarize Bolzano's criticism, which is distributed over his and his student's (...) work. At the beginning we will work out the (more fundamental) theoretical differences between Kant's and Bolzano's philosophy to see what roles these play in the construction of the antinomies. (shrink)

In demarcating science from pseudo-science and non-science, traditional suggestions make verifiability or falsifiability the decisive criteria. it is in the context of questioning and problem-stating that the activities of verifying and falsifying really receive their significance. the purpose of the work is to demarcate science by proposing criteria for scientific problem-stating. logic of discovery can supply the criteria (cf. bolzano, cf. also traditional problem lists).

This paper reconsiders the relation between Kantian transcendental reflection and 20th century philosophy of science. As has been pointed out by Michael Friedman and others, the notion of a "relativized a priori" played a central role in Rudolf Carnap's, Hans Reichenbach's and other logical empiricists' thought. Thus, even though the logical empiricists dispensed with Kantian synthetic a priori judgments, they did maintain a crucial Kantian doctrine, viz., a distinction between the level of establishing norms for empirical inquiry and the level (...) of norm-governed inquiry itself. Even though Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions is often taken to be diametrically opposed to the received view of science inherited from logical empiricism, a version of this basically Kantian distinction is preserved in Kuhn's thought. In this respect, as Friedman has argued, Kuhn is closer to Carnap's theory of linguistic frameworks than, say, W.V. Quine's holistic naturalism. Kuhn, indeed, might be described as a "new Kant" in post-empiricist philosophy of science. This article examines, first, the relativization of the Kantian a priori in Reichenbach's work, arguing that while Reichenbach criticized "transcendentalism", he nevertheless retained, in a reinterpreted form, a Kantian-like transcendental method, claiming that the task of philosophy is to discover and analyze the presuppositions underlying the applicability of conceptual systems. Then, some reflections on Kuhn's views on realism are offered, and it is suggested that Kuhn can be reinterpreted as a Kantian transcendental idealist. Given the central importance of Kuhnian themes in contemporary philosophy of science, it is no exaggeration to claim that Kantian transcendental inquiry into the constitutive principles of empirical knowledge, and even transcendental idealism, still have a crucial role to play in this field and deserve further scrutiny. (shrink)

Kant's essay ‘On the common saying: “This may be true in theory, but it does not apply in practice”’ contains a chapter ‘On the relationship of theory to practice in political right’ to which he added, in brackets, ‘’. The problem is that Kant leaves his Hobbes-criticism implicit. The main point seems to be the Hobbes's citizens are without any rights. We explore the differences and similarities between Kant's and Hobbes's political views and evaluate the effectiveness of Kant's criticism. We (...) pay attention to Nominalism and Platonism, the idea of happiness in social life, the use and role of the Golden Rule in political thought, the quest for freedom, and the principle of political non-resistance. Especially freedom of speech is important for Kant as an Enlightenment thinker. This is the only right Kant's citizens may have, independently of the sovereign's will. Our conclusion is that both Kant and Hobbes emphasize peace and order under sovereign power although they do not agree on how such an ideal can be achieved. (shrink)

El presente trabajo muestra cómo, a pesar de que Kant y Hobbes parten del supuesto de una natural belicosodad de los seres humanos y una tendencia hacia la desobediencia, cada uno arriba a soluciones radicalmente diferentes. Kant, en el escrito Acerca del dicho: ¿Esto puede ser verdad en teoría pero no en la práctica¿ contiene un capítulo expresamente contra Hobbes y, fundado en las tesis de la Ilustración, intenta salvar el derecho de los subditos frente al monarca, no obstante que (...) lo reduce a la libertad de expresión. (shrink)

Der Begriff 'Sinn' wird im Tractatus in mehrfachem Sinn gebraucht und dem Wertbegriff angenähert. Die Wertprädikate wie 'schön' und 'gut' gehören aber im Tractatus zum Unsinnigen. Während das Sinnvolle in der Beschreibung der Wirklichkeit besteht und das Sinnlose als Grundlage der Deutung der Logik funktioniert, soll das Unsinnige schlechthin unaussag- und undenkbar sein. Dennoch ist es möglich, zwischen zwei Arten des Unsinnigen im Tractatus zu unterscheiden: (1) was gezeigt werden kann, (2) was ohne irgendwelche kognitive Funktion ist. Das mystische Zeigen (...) wird in der späteren Philosophie Wittgensteins entmystifiziert. In ihr kann man auch einer gewissen Differenzierung zwischen der ethischen Charakterisierung und der ästhetischen Charakterisierung der Wirklichkeit nachspüren. (shrink)

There are philosophers who think that questions of fact can be distinguished from questions of interpretation of facts. Davidson calls the distinction between unconceptualized facts and interpretative schemes "the third dogma of empiricism". This points to Quine's article 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism". In it, Quine challenged the distinction between synthetic and analytic statements and the possibility of reducing the meaning of all synthetic statements to immediateexperience. Whereas Quine has remained faithful to empiricism, Davidson gives up empiricism. It is difficult to (...) determine his standpoint. His remark that our actual scheme is best understood as extensional and materialistic, is rather perplexing. Is it intelligible, under Davidson's premisses, to speak of our actual scheme? (shrink)

This paper reconsiders the relation between Kantian transcendental reflection (including transcendental idealism) and 20th century philosophy of science. As has been pointed out by Michael Friedman and others, the notion of a "relativized a priori" played a central role in Rudolf Carnap's, Hans Reichenbach's and other logical empiricists' thought. Thus, even though the logical empiricists dispensed with Kantian synthetic a priori judgments, they did maintain a crucial Kantian doctrine, viz., a distinction between the (transcendental) level of establishing norms for empirical (...) inquiry and the (empirical) level of norm-governed inquiry itself. Even though Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions is often taken to be diametrically opposed to the received view of science inherited from logical empiricism, a version of this basically Kantian distinction is preserved in Kuhn's thought. In this respect, as Friedman has argued, Kuhn is closer to Carnap's theory of linguistic frameworks than, say, W.V. Quine's holistic naturalism. Kuhn, indeed, might be described as a "new Kant" in post-empiricist philosophy of science. This article examines, first, the relativization of the Kantian a priori in Reichenbach's work, arguing that while Reichenbach (after having given up his original Kantianism) criticized "transcendentalism", he nevertheless retained, in a reinterpreted form, a Kantian-like transcendental method, claiming that the task of philosophy (of science) is to discover and analyze the presuppositions underlying the applicability of conceptual systems. Then, some reflections on Kuhn's views on realism are offered, and it is suggested that Kuhn (as well as some other influential contributors to the realism debate, such as Hilary Putnam) can be reinterpreted as a (relativized, naturalized) Kantian transcendental idealist. Given the central importance of Kuhnian themes in contemporary philosophy of science, it is no exaggeration to claim that Kantian transcendental inquiry into the constitutive principles of empirical knowledge, and even transcendental idealism (as the framework for such inquiry), still have a crucial role to play in this field and deserve further scrutiny. (shrink)

Članek poda fenomenološki prispevek k estetiki vsakdanjosti, pri čemer izhaja iz nekaterih konceptov, ki jih je razvil Martin Heidegger. Cilj je razumeti pravo naravo same vsakdanjosti v vsej njeni dolgočasnosti in sivini ter poudariti, da v vsakodnevnosti obstaja estetski vidik. Estetika vsakdanjosti ni le »izjemno v navadnem«. Da bi razumeli celoten obseg estetike vsakdanjosti, moramo raziskati fenomen navadnega in vsakdanjega. V pričujočem članku je ontologija človekove vsakdanje eksistence razložena s pojmi kraja, življenjskega sveta, domačnosti in tujosti. Estetski vidik vsakdanjega temelji (...) na teh eksistencialnih strukturah. Človekova eksistenca se večino časa godi na domačem kraju – ki je lahko dom, delovni prostor ali pa poznani predeli v domačem mestu. Ko se premikamo po domačem območju, občutimo izkustveno ukoreninjenost in varnost. Element nepričakovanosti, ki je včasih povezan z občutkom tesnobe ali celo strahu, umanjka. Prav to dejstvo, da ni nobenih presenečenj, da stvari potekajo gladko, kot pričakujemo, je prijetno. Početi stvari na rutinski način ima določene vzorce, ki so zadovoljujoči, v njih pa je tudi estetski vidik. Estetika vsakdanjosti se nahaja v odsotnosti izjemnega, v občutku počutiti se doma in imeti nadzor. Estetika domačega je estetika manka, tiha fascinacija z odsotnostjo zahtev iz okolice. (shrink)

Pojam globalizacije koristi se u različitim kontekstima i u različitim značenjima; pojam miješa činjenice i fikciju – postojeće i nepostojeće. Pojam globalizacije odnosi se na, primjerice, ekonomske, političke i kulturne procese koji nadilaze granice nacionalnih država. Nema filozofskog, odnosno konceptualnog utemeljenja globalizacije. Zapadni filozofski metanarativi interpretiraju se lokalno; ne postoji globalna interpretacija metanarativa. Etimološki ‘razumijevanje’ znači stajanje između razlika, na primjer između činjenica i fikcije. Logika stručnosti je logika stajanja između nada i realnosti – između nepostojećeg i postojećeg. Logika stručnosti (...) je opća teorija razumijevanja. Kao istinski opća teorija, logika stručnosti globalno nadilazi granice. Prema tome, logika stručnosti oblikuje temelj za filozofiju globalizacije. (shrink)

L’idea guida di questo saggio è la combinazione dell’antica idea che le buone società sono quelle che consentono e promuovono la vita buona, la prosperità o il benessere dei cittadini, con l’idea moderna che i cittadini devono essere considerati individui autonomi. Le teorie del riconoscimento (recognition), a partire da Fichte e Hegel in poi, forniscono una promettente cornice teoretica per provare a considerare le persone come individui e, nel contempo, come membri dell’insieme sociale. Queste pagine cercano di delineare il modo (...) in cui il riconoscimento interpersonale e istituzionale si presenta come una costituente e una precondizione nella vita dei moderni individui autonomi. Nella prima parte di questo saggio mi chiedo cosa sia il riconoscimento, specialmente nella sua forma interpersonale e istituzionale, continuando così il lavoro di analisi su questo concetto condotto insieme a Heikki Ikäheimo. Questo dibattito è ispirato in particolar modo dalle teorie del riconoscimento di Hegel, Axel Honneth, Charles Taylor e Nancy Fraser. Nella seconda parte provo a caratterizzare i contorni della vita buona, in particolare la vita buona di individui autonomi, e mi domando quali siano le precondizioni di cui essa necessita. Distinguerò cinque tipi di precondizioni: psicologica, materiale, culturale, intersoggettiva e istituzionale. La questione da esaminare è quale sia il ruolo del riconoscimento, così come viene definito nella prima parte, fra le suddette precondizioni. Inoltre, mi chiederò anche se il riconoscimento non sia soltanto un prerequisito, ma piuttosto un costituente o un ingrediente della vita buona. Alcuni dei miei commenti riguarderanno la differenza fra riconoscimento e redistribuzione nel dibattito fra la Fraser e Honneth. (shrink)